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Theory of the Subject as Pronoun
Rhoda Hanafi
Theorie du sujet en tant que pronom
La fonction principale des pronoms personnels est deictique.
Remplat;;ant des noms propres, ils sont sans statut referentiel saufdans
une enonciation particuliere. eet aspect de la grammaire fournit un
champ privilegie pour etudier la construction de la subjectivite,
puisque les pronoms constituent un element necessaire de ce
phenomene. La construction du sujet litteraire est encore plus
problematique, puisque le sujet ecrivant/ecrit doit sesituerdoublement
dans le temps et l'espace. Lorsque, dans l'ecriture, un 'je' s'adresseaun
'tulvous', lecteur, texte et ecrivain participent dans un echange tri-
angulaire des roles representes par les pronoms personnels. L'origo
fixe du 'moi-ici-maintenant' deictique se transforme en un jeukaleido-
scopique, une scene changeante de la subjectivite. En ecrivant des let-
tresaleurs enfants ou des journaux intimes, les femmes produisent des
monologues deguises en dialogue. Il s'agit d'un moyen de prolonger
1'illusion qu'il soit possible d'ecrire en dehors des ideologies patriar-
cales, en refusant d'accepter l'arbitraire du signe. 'Illelle', la troisieme
personne, est unefiction exploitee par le mode de narration institution-
nalise dans le roman ou 1'epopee. Par contre,quand le 'je' parleau 'tu',
nous avons 1'impression d'echapper ace circuit, de communiquer
directement, de fat;;on transparente, avec l'autre, en contournant
l'ordre symbolique.
1. Spatially
We cannot sayanythingabout languageor thefunctioning oflanguage
if we stay on the position of metalanguage. But language says some-
thing concerning itself in the permanent plays with its own categories,
and that is what literary texts say. But it is not philosophical, it is not
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scientific. It is another practiceo/language,anotherstatusofthe speak-
ing subject. - Julia Kristeva, Semiotica, supp. (1981), p.217.
'I' subject speak(s), tracing the imaginary conceptualized line
between language and meta-Ianguage, infiltrating mySelf into the
interstice that separates within and without.1 Not to talk about lan-
guage but within language, narcotizing (blowing up, exaggerating)
the permanent plays with its own categories. Speaking, saying: the
very practice of the sujet en proces2 as it delineates its own within and
without.
The boundary, then, of meta-/ object, this oblique slash, shall pro-
vide the itinerary for this discourse - un parcours de discours - which, at
once, fills up the interstice and traces out its boundary. Not a confine,
no legal border, but a permanent play, a ceaseless diversion, on a
detour from meta- (= 'beyond, transcending') to ... ?
But how do(es) 'I' go beyond, transcending language? (And so she
saw reflected in a double play of mirrors that old stand-by, mise en
abyme, language reflected/ing in meta-Ianguage, an impoverished
game of polished surfaces, false infinity trapped within the finite faces
of narcissistic imaging.) There is no infinity here, no meta-
supposition, no transcendental language turning with-in in/to with-
out. What contour do we (= you +me) grasp, which handholds do we
grip, in order to turn 'language' inside out? Prestidigitation, then? A
sort of intellectual mummery? Or anotherpermanent play to showup
other, unheard-of cracks between meta- and ... ?
This interstice, then, is a hollow fiction: diction dictating discourse,
and discourse dictating diction: a 'metaphyctional' fiction fissuring
the solid wall of meta/language. It is in this crevice that 'I' insinuates
itself, speaking, being spoken, taking on its own solidity as it fills up
this heterogenous hollow.
2. Temporally
'''1'' subject speak(s) ...' (t)here, presently, in full presence, tracing out
its contour (do yousee it?) by this writing. Locate it. Mark the spot. Sig-
nifying, signalling its presence in/by the signifier, it locates mySelf in
the present-already-past. (A new tense: the tense of 'ecriture': le
present-deja-passe.)
Benveniste writes that 'ce "present" ... n'a comme reference tem-
porelle qu'une donnee linguistique: la coincidence de l'evenementt
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decrit avec1'instance de discours quile decrit.,3 Sheer coincidence, the
present gives itself to conceptualization only in enunciation: a paltry
sort of gift, this'donnee linguistique' offers itselfup only as '1 coincid-
ing of event and description. So that in referring, in mentioning, the
speaker utters a temporal reference, a sort of temporary refuge in an
unco-ordinated space. Dismantled as it is erected, the present is
reconstructed in/by the peripatetic peripheries of the signifier.
3. Presently
On arrive ainsiacette constatation -surprenanteapremiere vue, mais
profondement accordeeala nature reelle du langage - que le seul temps
inherentala langue est le present axial du discours,et que ce present est
implicite. Il determine deux autres references temporelles; celles-ci sont
necessairement explicitees dans un signifiant et en retour font
apparaftre le present comme un ligne de separation entre ce qui n'est
plus present et ce qui va etre. - Emile Benveniste, Problemes du lan-
gage, Benveniste et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p.9.
The present is implicit inspeech as it is inherent to language. Bystating
'I,' I locate(s) a 'generating axial centre,' a temporal! spatial axis. A
line, then, of affirmation and separation: affirming 'now' and 'here,'
yet separating present from past/future, 'I' rends as it renders, part-
ing, splitthtg what no longer is from what may be, yet simultaneously
defining the very possibility for that split.
This line of separation is affirmed, however, only in discourse:
'C'est dans l'instance de discours OU je designe le locuteurque celui-ci
s'enonce comme "sujet.",4 Speaker and subject synonyrnize in dis-
course; the 'I' speaks itSelf in/onto a graphic location through pro-
nominal appropriation. Subjectivity in these terms is nothing other
than the locus oflocution, a plotting ofthe personona time/space con-
tinuum in the precise instance of speech.
Two intersecting perpendicular strokes on the page can serve as
a coordinate system for us with0 as the origo, the point oforigin
for the coordinates:
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I maintain that three deictic words must be put at the place of0,
if this scheme is to represent the deictic field ofhuman language,
namely the deictic words here, now, and 1. These lexical items, so
simple in their sound structure, might induce the language
theorist into esoteric philosophical abysses or to respectful
silence, when challenged to determine their function. Rather, he
should simply acknowledge that it is certainlyverypeculiar,but
nevertheless precisely statable, how they function in a concrete
utterance.s
The 0, origo of indexical reference is a dangerous abyss which 'I'
skirts either by remaining respectfully silent or by concretizing itSelf
in utterance. 'I' does not symbolize or name, Vit denote(s) nothingbut
its/my presence, pointing directly to an original point of reference: the
origo of subjectivity. Deictic gestures that indicate nothing but the
point of origin in speech, JI,' Jhere' and Jnow' Jdemand that they be
characterized as signals' thus distinguishing themselves from the
naming words, which Jfunction as symbols, and receive their specific
complete and precise meaning within the synsemantic field.,6
Excluded from meaning as a conventional (syntactic/semantic) field
of sign-functions, deictic markers take up residence only on the out-
skirts of the symbolic fields, in a situationat contextual cross-current
of temporary forces?
As Benveniste writes: J[Les pronoms] se distinguent de toutes les
designations que la langue articule, en ceci: ils ne renvoient ni aun con-
cept ni aun individu.'8 JSingulier,'9 Jpeculiar,dO Jstaggering,' or Jscan-
dalous,'11 'I' is the nomadic nomenclature for a nonproductive, non-
existent nomination.
5. land You
(If they are to be humanJthey must be at least two in number.)
- Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,
ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell u.P.,
1980), p. 43.
Le langage n'est possible que parce que chaque locuteur se pose comme
sujet, en renvoyant alui-meme comme je dans son discours. De cefait,
je pose une autre personne, celle qui, tout extbieure qu'elle est aJmoi,'
devient mon echo auquel je dis tu et qui me dit tu. [.. .J Cette polarite ne
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signifie pas egalite ni symetrie: 'ego' a toujours une position de tran-
scendance aZ'egard de tu; neanmoins, aucun des deux termes ne se
con~oit sans l'autre; ils sont complementaires, mais selon une opposi-
tion 'interieur/ exterieur/ et en meme temps ils sont reversibles.
- Emile Benveniste, Problemes de linguistiques generales (Paris:
Gallimard, 1966), p.260.
As 'I' explore(s) the confines of subjectivity, running back and forth
along the border of metallanguage, necessarily implicatingmy/itSelf
in a non-symbolic, deictic field, and at once, circumscribing the origo
of referential speech, 'I' also, by my/its very allocution, allocate(s) an-
other in my/its subjective economy. Within and without, 'vers
l'inh~rieur'and 'vers l'exterieur,' are the reversible sides of an isolat-
ing membrane which inwardly and outwardly designs the structures
and regions of the communication act. This common border is a
resonating surface, enclosing an echoing chamber of the person: 'I'
speak(s), say(s) my/itSelfand simultaneouslyhear(s) echoed backthe
voice of 'you,' a voice that paradoxically originates with, and within,
the isolatingconfines of 'me.' The person, like the present,bothaffirms
and separates: affirms itSelf in the appropriation of the personal pro-
noun, and separates itSelf from the exterior in the instant substantia-
tion of the other, 'you.'
If neither equal nor symmetrical, however, how is this 'polarity of
persons' to be characterized?
La subjectivite se laisse localiser un instant dans une stase pro-
nominale qui, sans etre isolee en soi, maintient des relations
definies avec les autres. Du point de vue de cette instantanelte de
la subjectivite dans l'usage normatif du langage, l'ego toujours
transcendental et surplombant l'allocution, ne s'isole qu'en
s'opposant a tuP
Subjectivity is not any thing: it is a motionlessness, an instanta-
neous stasis in a pronominal equilibrium brought on by a relational
positing of 'I' and others. 'Ego' remains 'transcendental and over-
hanging allocution,' silently poised on the outward rim of speech,
over and above the localising effect of discursive orientation. But in
utterance, division and complementarity: an instantaneous splitting
of the 'forever transcendental' I which cleaves itself into the opposi-
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tional sides of the same, reversible (non-)duality: 'I' becomes 'you,'
and 'you,' 'I,' so that 'you' is both other and the same; not a difference,
but rather a question of positionality on the self-same axis.
La conscience de soin'est possible que si elle s'eprouve par con-
traste. Je n'emploie je qu'en m'adressant aquelqu'un, qui sera
dans mon allocution un tu. C'est cette condition de dialogue qui
est constitutive de la personne, car elle implique en reciprocite
que je deviens tu dans l'allocution de celui qui a son tour se
designe par je.13
Ainsi ne s'etonnera-t-on pas de constater que 'tu' est une fa~on
de nommer 'je,' que 'tu' cache 'je.J14
Allocution thus implies dialogue and reciprocity: a speech drama
in which the personae exchange the masks of their person15 in a recip-
rocal play of pronominal cache-cache (hide-and-seek). A strange game,
paradoxically contrived, in which the players reveal themselves
through speech, call attention to their own presence, and affirm to
themselves their Selves, while at the same time implicating the other
through a reciprocal gift of persona, thus masking, covering up, and
assuming the pretence ofpronominal allocation in an endless series of
moves, stases and hypostases.
Subjectivity is not any thing: it is the itinerant effect of an incessant
positing and posing of the person, a double play that calls into action
'I' and 'You' in a perpetual game of revealment and masking.
6.S/he
Dans les deux premieres personnes, il y a a la fois une personne
impliquee et un discours sur cette personne. 'Je' designe celui qui parle
et impliqueen meme temps un enoncesur le compte de 'je': disant 'je,' je
ne puis pas parler de moi. A la 2e personne, 'tu' est necessairement
designe par 'je'; et, en meme temps, 'je' enonce quelque chose comme
predicat de 'tu.' Mais de la 3e personne, un predicat est bien enonce,
seulementhors de 'je-tu'; cette forme est ainsi exceptee de la relation par
laquelle 'je' et 'tu' se specijient. Des lors la legitimite de cette forme
comme 'personne' se trouve mise en question.
- Benveniste, PLG,228.
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[I]l est mechant: c'est le mot le plus mechant de la langue: pronom de la
non-personne, il annule et mortifie son reftrant; on ne peut l'appliquer
sans malaise aqui l'on aime; disant de quelqu'un 'il,' j'ai toujours en
vue une sorte de meutre par le langage....
- Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 1975),p. 171.
'I' and 'you' engaged in conversation; as we exchange the masks of
person in a mutual reaffirmation of the status of subject, we implicate
each other in our deictic fields, revealing the presence of our person-
hood through our enunciation. 'I' say(s) 's/he,' and this utterance
immediately points to a reference outside our shared coordinate sys-
tem, a point exterior to the echoing chamber constituted by our dis-
course. 'Slhe' is an absent entity, designating no one in particularoran
unspecified multiplicity of persons.16 The third person is a mis-
nomer, since the person it calls up is not, is a non-person, forever
excluded from the intimate reference of personal dialogue.
This murderous appellation distances the third other from any
access to the origo of subjectivity, and as such only names the possibil-
ity of person. It is thus a hypothetical nomenclature, the fictional per-
son par excellence.17
If 's/he' is annulled and mortified, hypothetisized and fictional-
ized, 's/he' also opens up for 'I' a route to a meta-linguistic promon-
tory:
Si l'enonciation se fixait en un 'il' ainsi isole de Yallocution, elle
pourrait s'articuler comme une metalangage ou comme une
contemplation: tenu par un sujet forclos, soumis a la loi ou usur-
pant sa place.18
'Slhe' is the mark ofan utterance issued bya foreclosed subject, one
who is debarred from the linguistic Eden of innocent speech. For 'I' to
name an absent (non-)personor to refer to a pointoutside of the deictic
field of the discursive instant, 'I' must first ofall conceive of that exter-
ior, that other place, in order to 'plan the murder' from a transcenden-
tal position of self-conscious linguistic knowledge.
The third person is indeed a meta-fictional construct since its use
sets up a distancing effect, first by removing the subjective 'I' from the
third other while placing it in a field outside of the dialogical reference
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coordinates of 'we,' relegating 's/he' to the status of non-person and
thus setting up an unbroachable dichotomy between 'us' inside,
located, allocated in the discursive instant, and 'them,' outside, unlo-
catable, multiple, hypothetical creations oflanguage. Secondly, 's/he'
distances the speaking 'I' from speech itself, by calling attention to the
unnatural artifice of pronominal naming: where denotation is called
into question, where'onlyone' and 'many' are designatedby the same
term, the implicit transparency of the here-and-now clouds over,lan-
guage calls attention to itself and no longer to the message.19
7. Literally
Now let 'I' literize itSelf. Littering the marks of its/my presence in the
pages of an already-past present, what here-and-now do(es) 'I' ren-
der? These literal transcriptions of a displaced presence plot them-
selves endlessly onto any time and space coordinate system.
'L'instance du discours' is multiple, infinitely repeatable; re-enacted,
re-activated in the instance of reading, this instant transmutation
(ecriture to lecture) sunders the present from its original location.
Uprooted, evicted from its temporary/temporal refuge, the literary 'I'
takes on a migratory cast.
The implicitly present, seemingly inherent to unspoken language,
is, thus, once spoken, once signified, immediately implicated in
another time: the past of its own presence, marked in the trace of the
signifier, and the future ofits own re-enactment, given by the possibil-
ity of another reading. The literary 'I' is a necessary explication of the
migratory subject-in-process, forever en train de ..., straddling past,
present and future, locating itSelf in the double instance of ecriture-
lecture.2o 'In language and in the use oflanguage, duplicity plays a car-
dinal role.,21
The written is doubly duplicitous: referring 'back' to a no-longer
now and 'forward' to a possibly is, while re-enacting the here-and-
nowin a reader's present, the deliberately deceptive status of the liter-
ary text also confounds attempts to pin down the place of the person.
'I' and 'you' no longer designate speaker and listener, but some
kaleidoscopic hypostasis, an instantaneous stasis of a pyramidal pos-
iting between author, text, and reader.
'She,' then, is a fictitious fiction, a fiction withina fiction ofanimagi-
nary absent presence, realized solely within the confines of a literary
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possible world, and unlocatable except within that very imaginary
universe of discourse.
8. L'homme qui parle
[Le discours est] la langueen tant qu'assumee par l'homme qui parle,et
dans la condition d'intersubjectivitequi seule rend possible la commu-
nication linguistique. - Benveniste, PLG, 266.
'L'homme qui parle': two invisible appropriations combine to make
imperceptible and inaccessible la femme qui ecrit. Discourse, a running
back and forth (dis-cursus) between fully constituted subjectivities,
leaves undetected, unnoticeable, both women and writing, as if by
rendering inconspicuous this subsumation - a taking up under of the
hidden alterities - they will remain undetected, and more, incapable
ofbeingseen. This visionarylapsus is not just a metaphysical slippage,
or an innocuous sliding of the signifier under the signified: when he
speaks, man takes on language, assumes it as his own, enters the sub-
jectivized area of linguistic communication through this very
assumption.
When does language become discourse, and speech, writing?
What is pernicious about this imperceptible lapse, and at what point
precisely does it fall through? Language is converted into discourse,
says Todorov22 through (not solely) the agency of the 'shifters,23 -
those empty deictic markers that stand outside denotative meaning,
gesturing, pointing, showing, but remaining (like women) naturally,
Naturely, mute and insignificant.24 It is by filling up the emptiness of
deictic signals that man signifies his self in the present, takes on pres-
ence, and presents himSelf in the act of communication. Denoting,
referring, appropriating proper names, marking his proper-ty
through self-identification, man circumscribes the 0, origo of the
here-and-now.25 Through the agency of deictic anchoring in contex-
tualized, concretized speech utterances, man traces out and fills in the
O-mphal(l)us of his own subjectivity. Et la femme qui ecrit? But what
about (the) woman who writes?
9. La femme qui ecrit
Aussit8t que produit, l'enonce disparaft, si fond dans l'enonciation
d'une nouvelle parole. Ephemere, sans laisser plus d'empreinte que le
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vol premier de l'oiseau ou que de fugaces etreintes. - Suzanne Lamy,
D'elles (Montreal: Hexagone, 1979), p.26.
[I]t is in the aspiration toward artistic and, in particular, literary cre-
ation that woman's desire for affirmation nowmanifests itself. Why lit-
erature? - Julia Kristeva, 'Women's Time,' trans. Alice Jardine,
Signs 7, 1 (1981), p.31.
A woman is in the act of writing. Puttingpen to paper, she enters into a
socio-symbolic contract, contractualizes herSelf into a signifying
practice, and encodes the expression of herSelf into a series of sign-
functions already negotiated by a community oflanguage-users. The
bargain has already been struck: the woman who writes is a woman
being written.
Whether excludedfrom the dominant discourse orsimplymargin-
alized, the writing woman is also confronted by a sense of invisibility:
her gender is subsumed under the imperialistic, supposedlyambisex-
ual, appellation of man. Her writing is thus an act of affirmation, an
attempt to make visible the fugacious flight of speech, to coalesce the
ephemeral chatter of the second sex into a socially valued form.
But not all writing is Literature. The literary is a prescriptive princ-
iple, and canonization a process of power at work, invitingsome texts
into, and rejecting others from its hallowed hall of fame. The woman
who writes maps out a strategy ofacceptance or rejection according to
the choices she makes: lexical, syntactical, narrative and discursive
(genre) choices.
Her marks on the page graphically proclaim a graffiti-like
affirmation of presence ('I was here,' scrawled on the back walls of the
literary ante-chamber); but, at the same time, this very writing disas-
sociates itself from its origin. It is bastardized speech, set loose to cir-
culate unparented in a signifying economy. The graphic assertion of
'I' is a locatingfunction, an affirmationofhere-and-now,but paradox-
ically, by not naming, bynot assigning a propername to this origo, the
woman26 who chooses to use personal pronouns dis-Iocates herSelf,
puts herSelf out of joint from the coordinating axes, displaces and
shifts herSelf to an anonymous empty position, capable ofbeingfilled
in and assumed by a multitude of readers. The 'I' (and 'you'), assumed
endlessly by the efforts of the reader, are thus more appropriable than
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the third person, which distances the reader by its meta-lingual and
meta-fictional effect. She, at once, asserts, locates, dislocates, dis-
places, renders anonymous, and pluralizes herSelf by this act. A stra-
tegic move, then, in the literary game, to bring the reader 'closer' by
allowing her / him to assume the origo of the already-past written
present, but one which simultaneously proclaims its distance from
the 'classic' novelistic genre, the murderous third-person narrative.
The pronominal dislocation is duplex: shifting the space-time coordi-
nates of the origo according to a reader's appropriation, it simulta-
neously displaces both writer and reader out of the literaryconfines of
a fictional constraint. .
This side-steppinggesture is also a nimble avoidance of the author-
itarian function of the Author, a patriarchal posture assumed by the
writer who 'fathers' the text, patents the literary product, propertizes
his patrimony before putting it out to circulate as exchange-value in
the economy of literary business. This public persona is nothing but
another social construct, one that a woman skirts by continuing to
write those traditionally 'female' forms such as the diary, the letter,
and the first-person monologue addressed to a 'you'-listener.
A sense of alienation from the authoritarian/authorial function,
then? An uncomfortable compromise in order to speak across the
outer, marginalized frequencies of the patriarchal channels of Litera-
ture? More than likely, excluded from the anthologies ofGreat Books,
and unwilling now to be recuperated into that tradition, the woman
writing today finds in the first-person monologue an anonymous dis-
course, bordering on the confines between transcribed voice, autobi-
ography (= herstory), and fiction, a fiction conceived outside the
genres that have exluded her until now.
10. Gender and Genre
Emerged from the world of silence and whispering to the world of
expression, from the time they first appear, women who write often are
drawn to the margins ofthe literary scene. We find them in forms oflit-
erature, that, if not precarious or deprived of tradition, are certainly
more fluid and easily realized. These are genres dominated, at least in
appearance, by a logic of the fragment more than that of the completed
project: collections of letters, epistolary novels, and diaries. Other
female writers turn to autobiography, a genre that always leads to a
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difficult process of verification of her own identity (from the Greek
graphia 'description,' autos 'one's own/ bios 'life'), - Elisabetta
Rasy, Le donne e la letteratura (Roma: Ed. Riuniti, 1978), p. 93. My
translation.
It seems to me that miming behaviour postulates from the beginning a
refusal of the arbitrariness of the sign. In fact, such behaviour moves
within the logic of the imaginary; the miming/ mimetic illusion con-
sists in the belief that the sign is adouble of the thing, that there exists
some relation ofnecessity between the two, that language adheres per-
fectly to reality in such a way as to mix up or blur the distinction
between the two. It is this illusion that lies at the base both ofepistolary
writing as well as diary writing. - Laura Kreyder, 'Una donna
banale/ Nuova Corrente 28, 86 (1981), p.504. My translation.
A clandestine denial offictionality, a searchfor refuge in marginalized
first-person forms, a development of lithe logic of the fragment/' a
refusal of the arbitrariness of the sign ... thus I1woman write(s) my/
herSelf into the symbolic order while remaining, all the same, within
the confines of the imaginary. Pursuedceaselessly around the borders
of signification, barred from entry into the dominant male discourse,
Jlshe put(s) in stakes where language seems its most transparent,
where fiction and reality superimpose: in the deployment of an I-
voice, telling the tale, describing my/her own life, as if the narration
itselfwere nothing more than a description ofan already-formed iden-
tity, rather than the very construction of that identity itself.
The illusion by which, between reality and the expression of
reality that we give in confidences, in letters and in diaries, there
exists only a link of naturalness, hides the fact that we order the
data of the lived according to the laws of a story!historythat has
already been written.27
History/ the story has already been written, but the passage from
passive, spoken object to active, speaking subject can only take place
in the act of narration. When I1woman tell(s) my!herstory, appropri-
ating a pronominal position, revealing the coordinates of here-and-
now (but displacing and shifting that origo according to the unlocat-
able origin of lecture) while implicating the other in my/her enuncia-
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ation (donning and exchanging the mask of the persona), I1she also
defy(ies) the fictionality of language, step(s) outside the generic con-
straints of Literature, refute(s) the power of Authorship, and enter(s)
into the socio-symbolic order while at once remaining on its thresh-
old. More precisely, I1she mark(s) the contours of my/her own iden-
tity, takes(s) on and trace(s) out the lineaments and substance of sub-
jecthood.
Notes
1 'Contrairement a ce [qu'on croit], with-out n'enferme pas les expressions
contradictoires "avec sans"; le sens propre de with est id "contre" (cf.
withstand) et marque pulsion ou effort dans une direction quelconque. De la
with-in "vers l'interieur" et with-out, "vers l'exterieur," d'ou "en dehors,
sans.'" Emile Benveniste, Problemes de linguistique generale (Paris: Gallinard,
1966), p. 81.
2 See Catharine Belsey's Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 64-7, for
a succinct account of this LacanianlKristevan term. See also under 'process'
in Leon S. Roudiez introductory glossary to Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).
3 Benveniste, p. 262.
4 Benveniste, p. 262.
5 Karl Biihler, Speech, Place, and Action, R.J. Jarvella and W. Klein, eds.
(Chichester: John Wiley and Sons,1982), p. 12.
'Deictic' means simply 'pointing or showing directly.' John Lyons has
defined deixis as '... the location and identification of persons, objects,
events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation
to the spatio-temporal context created and sustained by the act ofutterance.'
(From Lyons, John. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. London: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1977; quoted by Mark Steedman in Speech, Place, and Action,
p.l25.)
Lyons himself also notes (in Speech, Place,and Action, p. 106) that 'Peirce's
term "index" is but one of a set of grammatical and philosophical terms,
traditional and modern, all of which are based, in one way or another, upon
the notion of pointing: "deixis," "demonstrative," "ostension," etc.' We
could add 'shifters' to that list of terms.
See also Charles Fillmore, Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis (Indiana
Linguistic Club,1975), p. 39: 'Deixisis the name given to those formal
properties of utterances which are determined by, and which are interpreted
by knowing, certain aspects of the communication act in which the
utterances in question can play a role.'
Linguists identify three basic types ofdeixis: person (personal pronouns,
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proper names), place (eg. 'above,' 'there') and time (eg. 'yesterday,' 'next
Tuesday').
6 Biihler, p. 12.
7 Cf. Biihler, 19: 'Briefly speaking, the words I and you refer to the role holders
in the on-going speech drama, in the speech action. In prosopon, the Greeks
had an excellent name for it, and the Romans meant nothing by persona but
the role in the speech act. [...] The main and original function of personal
pronouns like I and you is not to denote sender and receiver, just as names
denote, but only to refer to these role holders....'
8 Benveniste, p. 26I.
9 Benveniste, p. 8I.
10 Biihler, p. 19.
11 Roland Barthes, in The Structuralist Controversy, R. Macksey and E. Donato,
eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), p. 144: 'Inasmuch as person, tense and
voice imply these remarkable linguistic beings - the "shifters" - they oblige
us to conceive language and discourse no longer in terms of an instrumental
and reified nomenclature, but in the very exercise of parole. The pronoun, for
example, which is without doubt the most staggering of the "shifters,"
belongs structurally to [parole]. That is its scandal, if you like....'
12 Julia Kristeva, 'Instances du discours et alteration du sujet,' Romanic Review
70,9 (1974), p. 77.
13 Benveniste, p. 260.
14 Kristeva, p. 86.
15 Note the double meaning of persona: in Latin it means 'mask.'
16 'Seule la "troisieme personne," etant non-personne, admet un veritable
pluriel.' Benveniste, p. 236.
17 "'le," extirpe de sa position, s'accroche donc aun "il" qui, pour etre hors
dialogue, ne designe aucun enonciateur de l'act discursif en cours, mais
marque simplement et objectivement la possibilitid'une instance de discours.'
Kristeva, p. 82.
18 Kristeva, p. 90.
19 '[S]hifters are distinguished from all other constituents of the linguistic code
solely by their compulsory reference to the given message.' Roman
Jakobson, Selected Writings, Vol. 2 (The Hague: Mouton), p. 132.
Jakobson places shifters in the Peircean category ofINDEXICAL
SYMBOLS: signs that are associated with the represented object by a
conventional rule, yet necessarily connected to that object by some
existential relation. Certainly 'I' fits into this analysis, since the speaker is
implicit to the act ofutterance (Le. is existentially related to the instance of
discourse); but in what way is 's/he' existentially related to the object it
represents? Rather the third person calls attention to the code itself by
referring to the possibility of language to name the absent or fictional
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person. It is for this reason that I characterize the use of the third person as a
metalingual function. (See Jakobson, Selected Writings, Vol. 7 (Berlin:
Mouton, 1985), p. 116: 'A metalanguage is a language in which we speak
about the verbal code itself.')
20 Cf. Jacques Derrida in The Structuralist Controversy, p. 155: 'When I look for
the present of discursive time, I don't find it. I find that this present is taken
not from the time of the enonciation but from a movement of temporalization
which poses the difference and consequently makes the present something
complicated, the product of an original synthesis which also means that the
present cannot be produced except in the movement which retains and
effaces it.'
21 Jakobson, Vo1.2, p.133.Jakobson's use here of the word 'duplicity' refers to
the duplex functioning of message and code which '... may at once be
utilized and referred to (= and pointed at)' (p. 130).
22 Tzvetan Todorov, The Structuralist Controversy, p. 316.
23 Kristeva recalls Jakobson's definition of shifters: 'des pronoms dans la
locution ... qui translatent le code dans le message, le proces de l'enonce dans
le proces de I'enonciation, les divers protagonistes de l'un dans l'autre et
vice versa.' She adds: 'C'est donc dans la locution elle-meme que les
pronoms jouent le role d'echangeurs entre divers niveaux et aspects de l'acte
et du systeme linguistique. La fiction ne ferait alors que mettre en evidence
le caractere de charniere de ces instances, en faisant jouer les translations
non seulement entre code et message, enonce et enonciation, mais dans tous
les sens et cl l'interior de chacune de ces divisions.' (pp. 78-79.)
24 Note the double meaning of this word: 1. unimportant, 2. non-signifying.
25 See Helene Cixous, 'Le sexe ou la tete?,' in Les Cahiers du GRlF,13 (1976),
pp. 5-15, for a discussion of the Realm of the Proper, identified with the male;
and Luce Irigaray, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1977).
26 Or man, of course.
27 Laura Kreyder, 'Una donna banale,' Nuovo Corrente 28,86 (1981), p. 511. My
translation.
